

Reararticulating Indonesia's Foreign Policy Identity in President Prabowo Subianto Discourse on Gaza (2024-2025)

Ighfar Halifi Arsyad¹

¹ Pondok Pesantren Salafy Terpadu Ar-Risalah Lirboyo, Kediri, Indonesia

ARTICLE INFO:

Paper Type:
Research Paper

Keywords:
Gaza, Indonesia's Foreign Policy Identity, Idiosyncratic Leadership, Independent and Active Foreign Policy, Prabowo Subianto

Article History

Received: 7 August 2025
Revised: 8 October 2025
Accepted: 5 January 2026
Available online: 4 March 2026

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0>)

ABSTRACT

This study examines the reararticulation of Indonesia's foreign policy identity in President Prabowo Subianto's discourse on the Gaza crisis during 2024–2025. Drawing on constructivism, role theory (National Role Conceptions), idiosyncratic leadership, and the two-level games framework with the win-set concept, this article argues that Prabowo's diplomacy represents a shift in Indonesia's identity from a normative solidarity maker toward an affirmative operational peacekeeper. Using a qualitative discourse analysis approach across seven key presidential speeches and a corpus of audience responses, the findings reveal three central dynamics: first, a reararticulation of the nodal point from religious solidarity toward universal anti-colonialism and global humanitarianism; second, a shift in role conception manifested through the offer of 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, the deployment of a hospital ship, and proposed Gaza reconstruction schemes; third, the idiosyncratic dimension of Prabowo's leadership that combines military discipline with multi-alignment diplomacy. Nevertheless, this transformation faces constraints in the form of a narrowing domestic win-set due to resistance from Islamic mass organizations, parliament, and digital public opinion, alongside structural tensions between the role of Palestinian defender and strategic mediator. The study concludes that Prabowo's approach represents an effort to re-stitch the independent and active doctrine to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, preserving the anti-colonial anchor while constructing a more institutional and operational diplomatic architecture.

*Corresponding author: ighfar88arsyad@gmail.com

Cite this article as: Arsyad, H.A., (2026) *Reararticulating Indonesia Foreign Policy Identity in Preseident Prabowo Subianto Discourse on Gaza (2024-2025)*. Paramadina Journal of Diplomacy & Foreign Policy, 03 (01), 43-51.

<https://journal.paramadina.ac.id/index.php/diplomacyforeignpolicy>

1. Introduction

The humanitarian crisis in Gaza following 7 October 2023 placed Indonesia in a diplomatic situation that demanded a response beyond mere statements of solidarity. By the end of 2025, more than 65,000 Palestinian lives had reportedly been lost, the majority of them women and

children, while the United Nations Security Council mechanism repeatedly failed due to the use of veto power by the United States. Within this context, President Prabowo Subianto, who was inaugurated on 20 October 2024, both inherited and challenged a long-standing doctrine: Indonesia's foreign policy identity as an anti-colonial defender of Palestine.

For nearly seven decades, Indonesia's position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has remained relatively stable, anchored by three pillars of identity: the anti-colonial mandate enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Mohammad Hatta's independent and active foreign policy doctrine, and the spirit of Asian–African solidarity born from the 1955 Bandung Conference (Sukma, 2003; Acharya, 2016). Only two presidents have ever attempted to substantively renegotiate this position. First, President Abdurrahman Wahid during 1999–2001, through the discourse of limited trade relations with Israel, and later, Prabowo Subianto during 2024–2025, through a combination of operational humanitarian diplomacy and a new rhetoric that conditioned recognition of Israel upon Palestinian sovereignty.

Prabowo's speech at the 80th UN General Assembly on 23 September 2025 marked a discursive turning point. The statement that the international community 'must recognize the State of Palestine, but must also guarantee the safety and security of Israel' became an ambiguous signal for domestic audiences accustomed to the binary opposition between Indonesia–Palestine and Israel. The accompanying commitment of 20,000 peacekeeping personnel, the KRI dr. Radjiman hospital ship, and a Gaza reconstruction plan transformed the speech into not merely a symbolic repositioning but also a high-stakes operational commitment.

This study addresses two questions. First, how do President Prabowo's speeches and statements (2024–2025) represent and renegotiate Indonesia's foreign policy identity on the Gaza issue; and second, how do domestic and international audience responses constrain or enable this transformation. These questions are answered through a qualitative discourse analysis approach across seven key speech corpora, complemented by a corpus of public responses from religious mass organizations, parliament, and the media.

This approach addresses gaps in the existing literature, which has tended to treat presidential speeches as supplements to policy analysis rather than as primary data for the production of identity. Accordingly, this study contributes to contemporary Indonesian foreign policy scholarship by offering a systematic reading of identity rearticulation mechanisms during the early period of Prabowo's administration, while

tracing the structural boundaries that shape Indonesia's diplomatic flexibility in the multipolar era.

2. Survey of Key Studies

The literature on Indonesia's foreign policy in the Israeli–Palestinian issue can be mapped into four complementary clusters. The first cluster focuses on normative foundations and historical continuity. Medina et al. (2026) and Muttaqien (2013) emphasize that Indonesia's support for Palestine is a manifestation of an 'ethical identity' rooted in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila values. Bachtiar et al. (2021) trace the thoughts of Soekarno, Wahid, and Maarif to demonstrate that consistent pro-Palestinian stances are accompanied by diverse articulations from anti-imperialist fervor to dialogic approaches. Rizqullah and Aisyah (2025) add a parliamentary dimension by highlighting the role of BKSAP DPR as a guardian of the moral corridor of executive policy.

The second cluster captures the transition from moral support to operational action. Gati and Hafid (2024) and Chandra et al. (2024) document Indonesia's role as mediator, facilitator, and provider of medical aid following the Hamas–Israel war of 2023. Manurung and Prihantoro (2025) introduce the concept of 'Concrete Action Diplomacy' to describe Indonesia's role transformation from humanitarian donor to regional security guarantor, while Yunazwardi et al. (2025) debate the ethical implications of the temporary relocation option for Gaza residents within the framework of humanitarian diplomacy.

The third cluster dissects economic pragmatism and international pressure through the two-level games framework. Barton and Rubenstein (2005) and Eliraz and Rakhmat (2023) reveal a pattern of 'stable non-recognition with functional contacts' operating in trade and security sectors. Mukti (2023) maps unofficial trade routes through third parties, while Izzurrahman and Prayetno (2024) focus their analysis on the dilemma between OECD accession ambitions and pro-Palestinian commitments that demand a balance of domestic and international win-sets.

The fourth cluster highlights presidential leadership and discourse analysis as drivers of policy change. Yadav (2025) describes the shift in Indonesia's foreign policy under Prabowo as an 'assertive identity' positioning Indonesia as an

influential middle power. Suswanto Ismadi Megah et al. (2021) and Isnaeni (2025) provide methodological grounding through speech act analysis and attitudinal analysis of presidential speeches, while Thies and Sari (2018) demonstrate that Indonesia's middle power status requires external recognition of its roles as 'good international citizen' and supporter of multilateralism.

Despite its richness, the existing literature has three main limitations. First, systematic corpus-based examinations of Prabowo's speeches as the primary locus of identity production remain rare. Second, existing studies tend to map dilemmas (normative vs pragmatic) without dissecting the public communication mechanisms that navigate domestic and international audiences simultaneously. Third, the idiosyncratic dimension of leadership, particularly how Prabowo's military background shapes his diplomatic style, has not been theoretically integrated with constructivist and two-level games frameworks. This study seeks to address these gaps.

3. Theoretical Framework

This study integrates four complementary theoretical frameworks: constructivism, national role theory, idiosyncratic leadership, and two-level games. This combination is chosen because the rearticulation of foreign policy identity cannot be explained through a single approach. It involves normative structures, leader agency, and multi-actor negotiation dynamics.

Wendt's constructivism (1992; 1999) provides the ontological foundation that national interests are formed through social processes of identity and norms. Material capabilities only acquire political meaning when interpreted through intersubjective understandings. In the context of Gaza, the 1945 Constitution, Hatta's independent and active doctrine, and the Bandung Spirit function as normative structures that constrain and enable presidential action. However, structures are not deterministic. Leaders, as active agents, can reinterpret the boundaries of appropriateness through speeches and diplomatic practices.

Role theory (Holsti, 1970; Harnisch, 2012; Thies, 2017) clarifies how identity is translated into specific roles: Palestinian defender, mediator, security contributor, or humanitarian actor. Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) introduce the concepts of vertical and horizontal role contestation to

capture the tug-of-war dynamics between government and civil society actors in defining 'what role is appropriate'. This framework is relevant for reading Indonesia's role conception shift from solidarity maker to operational peace-keeper.

The idiosyncratic approach (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Hermann, 1980) is used to dissect the personal dimension of Prabowo's leadership as a 'critical intervening variable' that filters structures into concrete policy choices. Prabowo's belief system, motivations, and decision-making style shaped by military command experience, personal diplomatic networks, and the philosophy of 'a thousand friends are too few, one enemy is too many' form a distinctive operational code that differentiates him from his predecessors.

Finally, Putnam's two-level games (1988) bridges identity analysis with the practice of policy formulation. Each presidential speech is a simultaneous negotiation at Level I (international forums) and Level II (domestic audiences). The win-set concept (the range of international agreements that can still be ratified domestically) is used to measure the flexibility of Indonesia's position amid resistance from Islamic mass organizations, parliament, and digital public opinion. The integration of these four frameworks enables a multidimensional analysis of identity rearticulation in Prabowo's discourse.

4. Research Method

This study employs a qualitative approach with a single case study design that is descriptive-analytical in nature (Creswell & Creswell, 2022). The primary corpus (P) consists of seven key speeches and official statements by President Prabowo Subianto during 2024–2025: the speech at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2024 (P01), the presidential inauguration speech 2024 (P02), the Antalya Diplomacy Forum 2025 (P03), the 19th PUIC Conference (P04), the UN High Level Conference on Palestine 2025 (P05), the 80th UN General Assembly (P06), and the inaugural Board of Peace meeting 2026 (P07) as a contextual implication.

The response corpus (R) includes official statements from Islamic mass organizations (Muhammadiyah, NU, MUI), positions of political parties, press releases from civil society coalitions, and publicly available international responses. The analysis is conducted in two stages:

first, Qualitative Content Analysis (Kuckartz & Rädiker, 2023) to map identity patterns and national role claims; second, Laclauian discourse analysis (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014; Bakumov, 2022) to dissect mechanisms of meaning rearticulation through nodal points, floating signifiers, and antagonism. Source triangulation is performed across official documents and credible media to maintain data validity.

5. Identity Rearticulation in Prabowo's Diplomacy

5.1 Discursive Structure: Nodal Points and Floating Signifiers

Laclauian analysis reveals that Prabowo's speeches restructure diplomatic concepts through two discursive operations. First, 'anti-colonialism' is preserved as the central nodal point, but its scope is expanded from religious solidarity toward universal humanitarianism. In his inauguration speech of 20 October 2024, Prabowo drew a direct line between Indonesia's colonial experience and Palestinian suffering, while emphasizing operational readiness: dispatching medical teams, evacuating wounded victims, and utilizing military hospitals to assist Gaza residents who had become victims of war.

Second, 'peace' is refilled as a floating signifier. No longer interpreted as merely a ceasefire, peace is framed as 'peace without hate, peace without suspicion', a condition that requires the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty alongside guarantees of Israeli security. This rearticulation shifts the logic of antagonism: Indonesia's adversary is no longer a particular state entity but rather the structure of oppression and double standards. This shift allows Indonesia to speak in a frequency acceptable to Western audiences without losing its moral pro-Palestinian anchor.

An important and easily overlooked dimension is strategic silence (Dingli, 2015). Although Prabowo repeatedly mentioned 'massacre' and 'innocent victims', he never used the term 'genocide' even after Amnesty International and the ICC adopted such terminology. This restraint in diction is not a softening of substance, Prabowo still conditioned recognition of Israel upon recognition of Palestine, a position more stringent than that of many Western states. The silence is a calibration that allows Indonesia to maintain the diplomatic access necessary to play

the role of operational peacekeeper on the ground.

Table 1. Rearticulation of Discourse Elements in Prabowo's Speeches on Gaza

Discourse Element	Traditional Articulation	Prabowo's Rearticulation	Impact on Identity
Nodal Point	Islamic solidarity / Anti-Zionism	Universal anti-colonialism / Humanitarianism	Expanding the legitimacy base into the secular-global domain
Floating Signifier: Peace	Absence of war / Ceasefire	Collective stability / Two-sided security	Positioning Indonesia as a rational actor (middle power)
Logic of Antagonism	Indonesia/Palestine vs Israel	Global justice vs Double standards / Oppression	Reducing diplomatic friction with Western actors

(Source: compiled by the author from the 2024–2025 speech corpus)

5.2 Role Conception Transformation: From Solidarity Maker to Operational Peacekeeper

A more substantial transformation occurs at the level of role conception. Since the era of Soekarno, Indonesia has played the role of a 'solidarity builder' that is vocal in moral condemnation but limited at the symbolic level. The Prabowo era marks a shift toward the role of 'operational peacekeeper' and 'security-humanitarian provider' (Holsti, 1970; Manurung & Prihantoro, 2025).

This shift is driven by the structural failure of international mechanisms. By the end of December 2025, Israel had recorded 969 ceasefire violations resulting in 418 fatalities, while only 19,764 of the promised 48,000 aid trucks were permitted entry. The UN Security Council repeatedly failed to produce binding resolutions due to U.S. vetoes. In this context, Prabowo offered an approach that 'becomes action' rather than merely 'being voice'—including the commitment of 20,000 UN peacekeeping personnel, contributions of 2,715 personnel to UNPKO, and the delivery of logistical aid through Hercules airdrops.

Table 2. Evolution of Indonesia's Diplomatic Role under Prabowo

Traditional Role	New Role	Empirical Indicators
Solidarity Builder	Operational Peacekeeper	Offer of 20,000 UN personnel (UNGA 2025); 2,715 personnel deployed in UNPKO (2024)

Traditional Role	New Role	Empirical Indicators
Norm Defender	Security & Humanitarian Provider	Gaza field hospital, ~1,000 medical evacuations; KRI dr. Radjiman delivering 242 tons of aid
Non-Aligned Position	Assertive Bridge Builder	Conditional normalization statement (May 2025); critique of Western double standards at UNGA 2025
Moral Voice of the Developing World	Affirmative Multilateral Actor	Food and climate commitments; language of 'shared responsibility' and 'civilian protection'

Source: compiled by the author from Prabowo's speeches 2024–2025 and UNPKO data

This role shift simultaneously reflects the logic of norm entrepreneurship (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), in which Indonesia attempts to establish a new standard for developing countries: that middle powers do not merely make speeches but also bear concrete responsibility for collective security. As a consequence, the continuity of anti-colonial values is combined with pragmatic multilateralism, a combination not previously explored comprehensively by his predecessors.

5.3 The Idiosyncratic Dimension of Prabowo's Leadership

Following the framework of Hermann (1980) and Byman and Pollack (2001), three idiosyncratic dimensions of Prabowo shape his operational code. First, Prabowo's belief system shifts from ideological purity toward 'pragmatic securitizer'. Indonesia's identity as defender of Palestine remains firm, but the manner of defending is filtered through the logic of stability and concrete capability. Second, Prabowo's achievement motivation drives efforts to demonstrate diplomatic 'weight' through action: hospital ships, medical evacuations, and proposed Gaza-Indonesia Special Economic Zone reconstruction schemes.

Third, Prabowo's action-oriented decision-making style shaped by command experience in Kopassus and Kostrad, as well as personal diplomatic networks built during exile in Jordan, produces a more centralized, swift diplomacy that is willing to bear reputational risk (Haripin et al., 2025; Setiawan & Fathun, 2025). The philosophy 'a thousand friends are too few, one enemy is too many' is manifested in the multi-alignment strategy: joining BRICS in January 2025 while maintaining the OECD accession track, strengthening the Two-Plus-Two dialogue

with China, while expanding the Super Garuda Shield partnership with the United States.

Domestic achievements, particularly the record rice production of 34.71 million tons and reserves of 3 million tons in 2025, serve as material legitimacy for speaking with greater confidence in international forums. For Prabowo, food self-sufficiency is a prerequisite for diplomatic dignity. This combination of military discipline, economic pragmatism, and humanitarian sensitivity differentiates his approach from Soekarno (idealist-revolutionary), Soeharto (pragmatic-closed), Wahid (dialogic-experimental), SBY (multilateralist-moderate), and Jokowi (economy-centric).

6. Constraints and Opportunities in Policy Transformation

6.1 Domestic Win-Set Dynamics (Level II)

At the domestic level, the identity transformation introduced by Prabowo confronts a layered structure of veto players. The main actors include parliament through the BKSAP DPR, religious mass organizations (particularly Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) and public opinion in the digital sphere. NU, through Ahmad Fahrur Rozi, tends to support Prabowo's strategic diplomacy as long as the goal of Palestinian independence is preserved, while Muhammadiyah, through Anwar Abbas, sets a more rigid limit: no normalization without Israel's 'repentance' for war crimes.

Table 3. Mapping of Domestic Actors and Win-Sets toward Prabowo's Rearticulation

Domestic Actor	Basis of Legitimacy	Response to Rearticulation	Tolerance Limit (Win-Set)
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	Pluralism, <i>wasathiyah</i> , dialogic diplomacy	Supports strategic diplomatic language as long as Palestinian independence remains the goal	Accepts active mediation and the two-state solution within recognized multilateral frameworks
Muhammadiyah	Global justice & theological solidarity	Demands Israeli 'repentance' and end of occupation before any normalization talks	Rejects security language perceived as legitimizing Israeli aggression
Parliament / BKSAP	Constitutional mandate of the 1945 Constitution	Guards the executive against softening; pushes for UN reform	Rejects any concession seen as deviating from the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution
Scholars & Activists	Anti-imperialism & human rights	Criticizes the diction of 'Israeli security' and the technocratization of colonial issues	Rejects symbolic normalization; demands accountability for human rights violations

(Source: compiled by the author from official statements and public responses 2024–2026)

This variation in positions creates win-set complexity: the president's room for maneuver tends to be flexible at the multilateral mediation level but tightens around language that may be interpreted as normalization. Prabowo responds with a layered framing strategy—constitutional-moral (references to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution), strategic-operational ('boots on the ground', field hospital), and pragmatic-sovereign ('peace without hate'). A four-hour closed-door meeting with 50 Islamic mass organization leaders in February 2026 became a key instrument for dampening opposition regarding Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace, with assurances that the mission of Indonesian forces was purely humanitarian.

The digital public sphere adds another layer of complexity. Clips of the UNGA-80 speech emphasizing 'guaranteed Israeli security' circulated without the conditional context, triggering narratives of covert normalization. Within the framework of Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), this phenomenon reflects horizontal role contestation typical of the social media era—where every diction is dissected, cut, and reinterpreted by non-governmental actors at high speed.

6.2 Negotiating the Global Stage (Level I)

At the international level, Indonesia positions itself as an 'affirmative middle power' bridging Western pragmatism expectations and Global South solidarity demands. OECD accession requires consensus from all members including Israel, while BRICS membership since January 2025 provides counterbalancing leverage. The multi-alignment strategy enables Indonesia to be an 'honest broker' acceptable to diverse parties: Muslim identity provides access to OIC, economic profile opens the path to OECD, and anti-colonial rhetoric maintains legitimacy in NAM and BRICS.

The commitment of 20,000 UN troops is an instrument of 'status diplomacy' to elevate Indonesia's bargaining power in shaping the Gaza reconstruction agenda. However, the role claim as a security provider carries risks: involvement in Western-dominated mechanisms may be read as a betrayal of the Palestinian struggle, while passivity would compromise middle power credibility. Prabowo navigates this dilemma through

explicit conditionality (recognition of Israel only after recognition of Palestinian sovereignty) which preserves moral consistency in the eyes of the Global South while opening communication channels with Washington and other Western capitals.

6.3 Structural Role Conflict

The role transformation entails the consequence of structural conflict between defender identity and mediator aspirations. As a defender, Indonesia is bound by language of stern condemnation; as a mediator, it is required to use diction acceptable to all parties. This tension is visible in the differing tones of Prabowo's speeches at OIC forums, which are more confrontational, compared with his more calibrated speeches at the UN act as a strategy that Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) refer to as a form of role compartmentalization to maintain coherence before heterogeneous audiences.

Table 4. Role Conflict and Prabowo's Identity Resolution

Role Conflict	Solidarity Demands	Pragmatism Demands	Prabowo's Identity Resolution
Mediator vs Defender	Total alignment & condemnation of Israel	Inclusive dialogue & security guarantees for all parties	'Peace without hate': Israeli security as a consequence of Palestinian independence
Autonomy vs Alliance	Reject Western dominance & uphold Non-Aligned principles	Pursue market access & global security-economic networks	'Multi-alignment': simultaneously joining BRICS while pursuing OECD for maximum bargaining power
Budget vs Morality	State budget prioritized for domestic welfare	Resource allocation for aid/reconstruction as reputational investment	Reaffirming that reconstruction funding is voluntary and non-permanent

(Source: compiled by the author from Prabowo's speeches 2024–2025)

Indonesia's experience at the OECD illustrates the greatest complexity. Accession is considered a prerequisite for escaping the middle-income trap and realizing the Indonesia Emas 2045 vision, yet Israel's status as a full member creates a 'firewall' for diplomacy. Although the government insists that accession will not change Indonesia's position toward Israel, the consensus requirement opens space for politically sensitive functional interaction. Prabowo's resolution to the dilemma of joining BRICS while pursuing OECD reflects an effort to

construct an equilibrium that may be fragile yet strategic in the short term.

7. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that during 2024–2025, Indonesia's foreign policy identity underwent significant rearticulation without losing its normative anchor. The shift occurs across three mutually reinforcing dimensions: first, the discursive structure changed with 'anti-colonialism' preserved as the nodal point but 'peace' refilled as a floating signifier requiring collective stability; second, role conception shifted from a normative solidarity maker toward an affirmative operational peacekeeper marked by the commitment of 20,000 UN troops, hospital ships, and Gaza reconstruction plans; third, Prabowo's idiosyncratic dimension blends military discipline, economic pragmatism, and humanitarian sensitivity in a distinctive multi-alignment strategy.

This transformation has not unfolded without friction. The narrowing of the domestic win-set due to resistance from Islamic mass organizations, parliament, and digital public opinion has compelled Prabowo to undertake constant discursive calibration. Strategic silence on the diction of 'genocide', the conditionality of recognizing Israel only upon Palestinian independence, and the layered framing strategy serve as instruments to maintain moral consistency before domestic audiences while expanding diplomatic access on the global stage. The structural tensions between defender and mediator roles are managed through role compartmentalization—adjusting tone across different forums.

Prabowo's approach can be read as an effort to re-stitch the independent and active doctrine to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. Indonesia's foreign policy now appears more institutional, operational, and security-sensitive, while consistently upholding the red line of anti-colonialism and humanitarian values. Indonesia's involvement in the Board of Peace in early 2026 becomes a consequential testing ground that will determine whether the identity shift crystallizes into a sustainable pattern or triggers significant domestic political contraction.

Several policy recommendations can be drawn from these findings. First, the government needs to strengthen public communication that explains the mandate and limits of Indonesia's international missions, particularly the limit of non-disarmament of Palestinian resistance

factions to allay domestic suspicions. Second, diplomatic institutionalization should be developed to ensure that the transformation does not depend on the personal figure of the president. Third, coordination among the executive, parliament (BKSAP), and Islamic mass organizations should be formalized through routine consultation mechanisms to strengthen domestic legitimacy. Fourth, Indonesia needs to develop analytical capacity to monitor the impact of strategic silence and discursive calibration on international credibility. Fifth, periodic evaluations of consistency between rhetoric and operational action should be conducted to ensure that defense diplomacy does not erode the normative anchor that has historically been the source of Indonesia's legitimacy in the Global South.

With proper calibration between moral anchor and operational capability, Indonesia has the opportunity to strengthen its position as a middle power capable of translating anti-colonial commitments into effective, legitimate, and trustworthy diplomatic actions—both in the eyes of its own people and the international community as it navigates Asia's twenty-first century multipolarity.

References

1. Acharya, A. (2016). Studying the Bandung conference from a global IR perspective. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 70(4), 342–357.
2. Anwar, D. F. (1994). *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign policy and regionalism*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
3. Anwar, M. D., & 'Aini, F. (2025). Analysis of political rhetoric in President Prabowo Subianto's speech at the 80th UN General Assembly 2025. *Jurnal Multidisiplin Ilmu Akademik*, 415–428.
4. Bachtiar, H., Razak, M., & Zakaria, S. (2021). Indonesian progressive Muslims and the discourse of the Israeli–Palestinian peace: Soekarno's, Abdurrahman Wahid's and Ahmad Syafii Maarif's thoughts. *Journal of Social Studies*, 17(1), 1–20.
5. Bakumov, P. (2022). An alternative model for the operationalization of discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. *Laboratorium: Zhurnal Sotsial'nykh Issledovaniy*, 14(3), 119–134.
6. Barton, G., & Rubenstein, C. (2005). Indonesia and Israel: A relationship in waiting. *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 157–170.
7. Boisen, C. (2024). Israel's punitive war on Palestinians in Gaza. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 1–22.

8. Byman, D. L., & Pollack, K. M. (2001). Let us now praise great men: Bringing the statesman back in. *International Security*, 25(4), 107–146.
9. Cantir, C., & Kaarbo, J. (2016). Domestic role contestation, foreign policy, and international relations. Routledge.
10. Chandra, A., Sukendro, A., Uksan, A., & Widodo, P. (2024). The role of Indonesia in mitigating the humanitarian impact of the war in Gaza through humanitarian assistance. *Journal of Law Politic and Humanities*, 1906–1920.
11. Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2022). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (5th ed.). SAGE.
12. Dingli, S. (2015). We need to talk about silence: Re-examining silence in International Relations theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(4), 721–742.
13. Eliraz, G., & Rakhmat, M. Z. (2023). Israel–Indonesia relations: An ongoing saga of unrecognition and backroom contacts. In Y. Evron & R. Kowner (Eds.), *Israel–Asia relations in the twenty-first century* (pp. 216–231). Routledge.
14. Faisal, M. (2018). *Contested foreign policy: Understanding Indonesia's regional and global roles* [Doctoral dissertation, University of Warwick].
15. Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887–917.
16. Galtung, J. (2008). Form and content of peace education. In *Encyclopedia of peace education*. Information Age Publishing.
17. Gati, A., & Hafid, A. (2024). Indonesia's diplomacy in the Israel–Palestine conflict as a constitutional mandate. *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional Indonesia*.
18. Hadiyanto, B., & Sulistiyono, S. T. (2025). Operation Alpha: The procurement of A-4 Skyhawk from Israel during the New Order era. *Jurnal Sejarah Indonesia*.
19. Haripin, M., Anwar, D. F., & Sebastian, L. C. (2025). Prabowo's defence diplomacy and Indonesia's strategic posture. *Contemporary South-east Asia*.
20. Harnisch, S. (2012). Conceptualizing in the minefield: Role theory and foreign policy learning. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 8(1), 47–69.
21. Hatta, M. (1948). *Mendajung antara dua karang* [Rowing between two reefs]. Departemen Luar Negeri RI [republished 1996].
22. Hermann, M. G. (1980). Explaining foreign policy behavior using the personal characteristics of political leaders. *International Studies Quarterly*, 24(1), 7–46.
23. Holsti, K. J. (1970). National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233–309.
24. Hopf, T. (2002). *Social construction of international politics: Identities and foreign policies, Moscow 1955 and 1999*. Cornell University Press.
25. Isnaeni, R. (2025). Commissive speech acts in President Prabowo's speech at the UN. *Jurnal Linguistik Indonesia*.
26. Izzurrahman, M. H., & Prayetno. (2024). Indonesia's diplomatic dilemma: Israel normalization and OECD accession in two-level games. *Jurnal Politik dan Pemerintahan*.
27. Karim, M. F. (2023). *Indonesia's regional and global engagement: Role theory and state transformation in foreign policy*. Routledge.
28. Kuckartz, U., & Rädiker, S. (2023). *Qualitative content analysis: Methods, practice and software*. SAGE.
29. Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (2014). *Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics* (2nd ed.). Verso.
30. Leifer, M. (1983). *Indonesia's foreign policy*. Allen & Unwin.
31. Manurung, H., & Prihantoro, K. (2025). *Concrete action diplomacy: Indonesia's evolving engagement in the Israel–Palestine conflict*. *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*.
32. Medina, F., Putri, R. A., & Hidayat, M. (2026). Ethical identity and Indonesia's policy on Palestine. *Ilomata International Journal of Social Science*.
33. Mudzakir, A. K. (2005). Gus Dur and Indonesia–Israel diplomacy: A reflective note. *Jurnal Pemikiran Islam*.
34. Mukti, K. W. (2023). *Bilateral trade relations between the Indonesian and Israeli governments* [Undergraduate thesis, Universitas Airlangga].
35. Muttaqien, M. (2013). Domestic politics and Indonesia's foreign policy on the Arab–Israeli conflict. *Global & Strategis*, 7(1), 57–72.
36. Peterson, J. (2025). Constitutional commitments and decolonisation in Indonesia's foreign policy. *Asian Journal of International Law*.
37. Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427–460.
38. Quinton-Brown, P. (2017). The South, the Bandung conference, and the politics of intervention. *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 9(3), 257–283.
39. Ramadhan, D., & Nurchalidin. (2024). Pluralism and tolerance: Gus Dur's trade relations with Israel. *C-Tiars*, 3(1), 54–64.
40. Rizqullah, F., & Aisyah, N. (2025). Indonesia's parliamentary diplomacy and the escalation of the Israel–Palestine conflict 2023–2024. *Jurnal Politica*, 16(1), 60–82.

41. Sebastian, L. C., & Marbun, R. (2025). Indonesian public attitudes toward the two-state solution. IDSS Paper.
42. Setiawan, A., & Fathun, L. M. (2025). Prabowo's defense diplomacy: Continuity and change. *Indonesian Journal of International Studies*.
43. Sukma, R. (2003). *Islam in Indonesian foreign policy*. RoutledgeCurzon.
44. Sukma, R. (2004). *Islam in Indonesian foreign policy: Domestic weakness and the dilemma of dual identity*. Routledge.
45. Sukma, R. (2011). Domestic politics and international posture: Constraints and possibilities. In A. Reid (Ed.), *Indonesia rising: The repositioning of Asia's third giant* (pp. 77–92). ISEAS.
46. Suoneto, A., & Evander, J. (2021). Prabowo Subianto: Strategic thinker and Indonesia's defense modernization. *Asia Pacific Defence Forum*.
47. Suswanto Ismadi Megah, et al. (2021). Attitudinal analysis and CDA of Indonesian presidential speeches. *Indonesian Journal of Discourse Studies*.
48. Thies, C. G. (2017). Role theory and foreign policy analysis in Latin America. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 13(3), 662–681.
49. Thies, C. G., & Sari, A. (2018). A role theory approach to middle powers: Making sense of Indonesia's place in the international system. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 40(3), 397–421.
50. Tir, J. (2010). Territorial diversion: Diversionary theory of war and territorial conflict. *Journal of Politics*, 72(2), 413–425.
51. Usman, A. (2017). The constitution and anti-colonial commitment in Indonesia's foreign policy. *Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara*.
52. Weber, M., & Winanti, P. (2016). The 'Bandung spirit' and the developmentalism of Indonesian foreign policy. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 8(2), 257–277.
53. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46(2), 391–425.
54. Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge University Press.
55. Yadav, A. S. (2025). Prabowo Subianto and the assertive turn in Indonesian foreign policy. *Verity Journal of International Studies*.
56. Yunazwardi, R., et al. (2025). Indonesia's humanitarian diplomacy and the temporary relocation option for Gaza residents. *Jurnal Diplomasi Indonesia*.

